

Prior Postscript

Edited by Max Cresswell and John N. Crossley

The reminiscences that follow are concerned with the role that Arthur Prior played in the development of logic in New Zealand. One question which is raised and not completely answered concerns how Prior got interested in logic in the first place. One of us (Max) was in August 1988 able to talk to Mary Prior in Oxford about some of these matters and was able to establish the formative role of J. N. Findlay, who was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago from the early 1930's until the end of 1944. Findlay was a PhD from Graz (just a stone's throw from Vienna and the Vienna circle) and a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College Oxford. In Findlay [1933] he refers to the work of Wittgenstein, Moore, and Ryle, and discusses Russell in a way that makes it clear that he was familiar with *Principia Mathematica* as well as *The Principles of Mathematics*. Prior was an undergraduate at Otago from 1932 (originally as a medical student) until 1935. In 1934 Prior attended Findlay's courses on logic and ethics and so came early under the influence of a teacher with a solid background in logic. Findlay's sabbatical in 1939 brought him in contact with Russell, Quine, Lewis and Wittgenstein, and in 1940 he was using Lewis and Langford [1932] as a course text.

Prior was out of New Zealand from 1937 until 1940 and although he did not return to academic life until he replaced Karl Popper at Christchurch in 1946, he had some contact with Findlay in Dunedin in 1941 and 1942. Prior attended some of Popper's W.E.A. lectures in 1943, but he and Popper were never colleagues. Despite the early influence of Findlay and others, Mary Prior points out that the necessity to teach logic at Canterbury was an enormous stimulus, and that Prior in many ways was an autodidact. (She conjectures, by the way, that it was Bochenski's work on the history of logic which produced Arthur Prior's devotion to the Polish notation.)

The cause of Prior's connection with logicians at Oxford such as E.J. Lemmon and Ivo Thomas was in fact the success of his 1949 book *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*. Although not a work in formal logic (or perhaps even because of that), this book caused quite a stir in Oxford and impressed John Austin and Gilbert Ryle, to the extent that Ryle, on his visit to New Zealand in 1954, came with an invitation for Prior to come to Oxford to deliver the John Locke lectures. These lectures were given in 1956 and published as *Time and Modality*, and it was that sabbatical which cemented Prior's contact with logicians in the British Isles.

Now we present a lightly edited version of a discussion at the 1981 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic (also a meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic), which took place in Room RB819, Victoria University of Wellington, from 8.45-9.45 pm, on Thursday 2 July 1981.

We are grateful to the participants for their permission to publish their remarks.

Participants (who took an active part in the discussion):

John Crossley (Chairman)
George Hughes
Robert Bull
Max Cresswell
Charles Hamblin
David Lewis
Ken Pledger
Martin Bunder

Krister Segerberg
Wilf Malcolm
Tom Richards
Pavel Tichy
John Kalman
Michael McRobbie

George Hughes: My first encounter with Arthur Prior was in 1951, just after I came to New Zealand. Prior, of course, was himself a New Zealander and had grown up here and was in charge of philosophy at the University of Canterbury as it now is. I came to Wellington and we started examining together, and apart from a very casual introductory meeting early in the year, my real meeting with him was when I went down to Christchurch to do examining together. I met him at four o'clock in the afternoon at the plane and we started to talk and went to his place and were joined by Mary Prior, his wife. We went on talking until Mary said: "I think I hear the birds." It was 4.45 a.m. We went on talking for a bit after that, so it was at least a 13-hour conversation — the longest serious conversation I think I've ever had with anybody, but perhaps Arthur was accustomed to this [sort of] thing. We talked about every conceivable topic under the sun, serious and not so serious, logic among them. By that time Arthur had in fact published one book — *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* (Prior [1949]), but it was a book on ethics not on logic, but he was obviously getting into the logic game. He'd written also a tiny little book of which I have a xeroxed copy; it was written — scribbled on a little notebook — for his children: *First Things in Logic* (Prior [2014]). It's an entertaining little book, but I can't remember it in detail just now. He was writing at that time another long book. It was never published and it was to be called *The Craft of Logic*, but I think most of the material in it that he wanted to salvage got absorbed into his first logic book that he did actually publish, the *Formal Logic* book (Prior [1956]). I remember suggesting to him when he was thinking of a title for this, why not call it the *Prior Analytics*, but he decided not. He had an enormous gift for imparting his enthusiasm to others. I was at that time, really, you might say, not a logician at all, though I had a kind of amateur interest in the subject. He started plying me with papers by [C.A.] Meredith about the shortest axiom for the pure implicational calculus, trying to get my interest worked up in that — with some success, I may say.

John Crossley: What year are we talking about?

George: We're now talking about late 1951, that was the date of the 13-hour conversation — there's quite a bit of correspondence about it. He was wildly sold on this Polish notation, which I can't stand — I can, at a pinch, read it. He had vigorous views about this, but I think he softened towards other things later in his life.

John: Do you know how he got into logic in the first place? Was it just through philosophy, or —?

George: Well, I can't answer that in detail but I think — yes, I think your way of putting this is a key to it, because I think there are two misunderstandings of Prior that have been current. One among philosophers, who thought of him - well, some philosophers thought of him as a person, a decent chap who was doing the proper things and then got seduced away into this silly logic stuff and started to tinker with symbols and forgot about everything else. And on the other hand, I think there were people who are the more austere mathematical type of logicians who thought that he was far too much of a metaphysician and not purely enough into logic. It seems to me those are both grave misunderstandings. I think that you only really get the flavour of what animated him if you saw that he never stopped being a philosopher. He did logic because he thought it helped him in his philosophy, and certainly he could, as I have said, do the symbolic stuff. He found that fascinating, but always at the basis of it, I think, there was an interest in metaphysics. He is always my prime example of the person who is a real fusion of the metaphysician and the logician. I think you won't understand what

underlies his work until you're prepared both to get worried by the metaphysical problems and also to follow him patiently through his proofs.

Max Cresswell: He does say at the beginning of PP&F (Prior [1967], p. 1), he speaks about a paper. I think one of Findlay's ([1941]. p. 261), that he thinks perhaps Findlay should be called the first tense logician. I can't remember exactly what the remark is. It does suggest that Findlay had some influence on him in making him aware of logic, but just how much. I don't know.

George: There was also an influence of Popper, surely, and Popper was in New Zealand for a number of years in the 1940s.

Robert Bull: How much did they actually overlap?

George: I thought they did a bit, and I would guess he learnt some of his logic in his early logical days from Popper.

John: Was there anybody else in the 1950s doing logic [in New Zealand] who comes to mind?

George: In the 1950s I was starting to do a bit myself; John Mackie who succeeded John Passmore, came to the University of Otago about 1955, I think — he used to do some. So did Bob Durant in Otago. [To Robert] You were doing some, I think.

Robert: I came on the scene in '57, anyway.

George: That's still in the 1950s.

John: When did you actually do your degrees?

Robert: I started my degree in '56 and I finished in '59, and that was with Prior.

John: Was that your first degree or your second degree?

Robert: That was my BSc and my Msc, yes.

John: So were you doing logic then with Prior?

Robert: Yes. This all started with my father. Well, I got second in schol[arship level] chemistry in New Zealand, and my father (who's a wicked man) said: "Don't do chemistry when you go to university; do philosophy". And he said: "What's more, don't do it in the first year (which was in '56, when Arthur was in England), wait a year until this joker Prior comes back from leave and go then". This was very good advice and I followed it to the letter; I've never touched a test-tube since. And here I am!

George: There's another person who should not be forgotten in this respect, though he wasn't here for very long in the 1950s, and that is Jonathan Bennett, who was a pupil of Arthur Prior's. He was an honours student I remember during my first year here in 1951, I can date him from that. He was a very good student, as you might expect, and he did an MA thesis on some logical topic. It was my first acquaintance with what came to be called the Barcan formula; well, that came into it at any rate, so it was a modal logic thing written in 1952, and that was directly under Prior's tuition and influence. And I think that in fact Prior got a lot of stimulation from having this very able and, for that matter, extroverted student to work with. He found this a sort of oasis in the desert, I think.

Robert: I think this is said in the foreword to [one of] Arthur's books.¹

John: You were at Canterbury at that time?

Robert: Yes, yes.

John: And did you stay there? What happened?

¹ Jonathan Bennett is thanked in the Preface to *Formal Logic* (Prior [1956]).

Robert: In '57, I went along to Arthur's Philosophy I course. In '58 I went along to some extra lectures he did. Jim Wilson was there. Mary Prior was there and one or two others. At the end of '58 Arthur went over to Manchester. There was then the problem of who on earth was to give the logic lectures in '59, which was my Master's year. Arthur suggested that I could give the first half of them and Jonathan Bennett could come over from England in the long Cambridge vacation and finish off the year. So between the two of us we looked after the logic lectures for '59. Now, in '59 I had been enrolled to do the standard mathematical thing at a practical level, which was to go over to Cambridge. and I was moaning to Arthur at the thought of more exams, which were the last straw. He said: "Don't do the Tripos at Cambridge, come to Manchester instead and do research". He managed to talk the Mathematics Department there into having me and it was there I was from 1960 until 1962.

John: And what about you. Max? How did you come into the picture?

Max: Well, I didn't ever know Prior when he was in New Zealand before he went to Manchester, but many people did. I was taught logic by George Hughes and David Londey in Wellington, and at that stage was interested in logic. I tolerated the rest of philosophy because of the logic and tried to turn as much of my coursework into logic as possible. I was desperate to go somewhere and work on logic. In particular I was interested in the problem of propositional attitudes - the logic of belief sentences - and almost the only person who was working on that was Arthur Prior. I decided I would go to Manchester and solve this problem for my Ph.D. I'm still working on the problem.

George: And did his Ph.D.

Max: I achieved one of my aims, but I'm still working on the other, yes. I think it was clearly people who knew Prior (and in fact they sent my M.A thesis over to him) who thought that Manchester would be a good place for me to go. So I went to Manchester at the end of 1961 and spent two years there, working with him, and I would meet him once a fortnight. I would go to him with some questions that I'd come up with in this Ph.D thesis and I'd say: "Now look, I'm worried about the following six or seven things". I don't think he ever once answered any of the questions I put to him. He would immediately start talking about something quite different and send me away with enough material for many more questions to come back with the next fortnight. It could be a bit heady at times — you would want everything nicely tied up and in fact he would be off telling you all sorts of other things that you could do, and it was at once exciting — sometimes it was a little frustrating in that, if you wanted to tidy things up and write a thesis, it was frustrating to be shown all the glories beyond. But I think in the long run it did give me at least this taste that there were all kinds of exciting things in logic to be done. I do remember one time, which has really got nothing to do with logic, but I remember that in Manchester there is a professor of philosophy, not Arthur but a very charming woman, a very good and quite well-known woman, named Dorothy Emmett, who did work in social philosophy. She was the Sir Samuel Hall Professor of Philosophy and every year she had to give the Sir Samuel Hall Oration. After this one year there was a philosophical party at Arthur's house, and I do remember Arthur, I think a little drunk, singing: "My name it is Sam Hall, it is Sam Hall" and listening to a record of that song.²

George: There are one or two other things about Prior in the early 1950s. One is that he quite certainly was quite a distance into tense logic by 1954, because the New Zealand philosophical conferences started in 1953, and Arthur used to go. He organized the first one in Canterbury, and a roaring success it was, too. I don't think any conference since then has had that kind

² Editors' note: Dorothy Emmet' delivered the 'Sir Samuel Oration' on Tuesday 4 December 1962 at the University of Manchester. So ANP's singing would be around that date. I (Max Cresswell) was certainly at the regular Thursday seminars at the Priors' house on 29 Nov and 6 Dec.

of sparkle and gaiety. I think it was a sense of: well, at last, we're able to hold a conference in this country where there are so few of us, and it sort of came off, which was very largely due to Arthur's enthusiasm. The second one was the following year, in Wellington, and I can very well remember Arthur gave the first opening address. Of course very few people knew any formal logic of the kind that Arthur was likely to do at that time, but it was in a lecture room with one of these double blackboards where you could pull one down and it hid the one underneath. Arthur went in an hour before the meeting, and he covered the blackboard with formulae — covered it — and then pulled down the blank one. He started his lecture about time and things and it all sounded good philosophical stuff, and suddenly, dramatically, he threw up the blackboard. And this was not just a dramatic gesture; it had everything of Arthur in it, somehow. He just took a delight in that.

John: Charles, you knew Arthur well — when and how?

Charles Hamblin: First of all, puns around his name. He showed me with great glee a footnote in an article by someone else. I can't remember who it was. The footnote had originally read "See Prior, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*" or something like that. The whole thing had been translated into Italian and the Italian translator had written something like "See de precedente, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics*".

Max: Talking about his name: once, I remember Ivo Thomas came to give a lecture at Manchester and made a great point (this was when Thomas was Prior of Blackfriars), there was a great argument between him and Arthur as to which was the real Prior.

George: May I just add one thing to that. Arthur was ANP and his wife was Mary Laura Prior, MLP, and it suddenly struck me one day that if you allowed yourself to do this wretched Polish stuff and write $ANpMLp$ you get a well-formed formula in Polish notation in modal logic, and I said to him, is this so? And he wrote back saying: "Yes, indeed. In fact it's a theorem of a system Łukasiewicz was devoted to in his later days". I wrote back saying: "It's a mad sort of theorem and what on earth could have made him think that might be true?" Arthur wrote back saying: "Old age, I should think".³

Max: He did use to write — at his philosophical parties on the lavatory door. He would write things like Apq [Either p or q] and $CLqq$ [If it is necessary to q then q].

Charles: I belong to the large army of people who really hardly knew Arthur Prior and yet somehow feel enormously indebted to him. They're all over the world and they're largely due to corresponding with him, getting the odd few letters now and again, and [finding him] enormously stimulating. He really took your correspondence seriously; some people write back and say: "Thank you for your letter". He'd write back with just a few sorts of queries, and somehow pick the eyes out of what you'd said. I was just trying to reckon it up. I met him, I think, four times: once in Manchester, once when he was travelling through Sydney we spent one weekend out at Taronga Park, once in Oxford when he was there, and then finally we were at a conference together about a month before he died, in the Black Forest.

³ Editors' note: $ANpMLp$ 'Arthur Norman Prior/Mary Laura Prior'. In Polish notation $p \supset MLp$ is $CpMLp$. With C defined as AN you get 1) $ANpMLp$. Adding 1 to \mathbf{T} you get the trivial system. We must prove that $\mathbf{T} + (1)$ gives $p \supset Lp$.

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|--------------------|---|
| (1) $\sim p/p$ | (i) $LMp \supset p$ |
| (1) (i) | (ii) $LMp \supset MLp$ |
| K | (iii) $M(p \supset q) \equiv (Lp \supset Mq)$ |
| (ii)(iii) | (iv) $M(Mp \supset Lp)$ |
| (iv) N | (v) $LM(Mp \supset Lp)$ |
| (v) (i) PC | (vi) $Mp \supset Lp$ |
| (vii) \mathbf{T} | (vii) $p \supset Lp$ |

Even without \mathbf{T} you have $Mp \supset Lp$. If M means 'is true at some next stage', and L means 'is true at every next stage', then $Mp \supset Lp$ is true in a deterministic program.

A very funny and very boring conference — it was on the study of time and Arthur cursed about being invited. Instead he went away and read that book [*The Call Girls* (Koestler [1972])] about how stupid conferences are. And as Arthur and I sat in the back row of all these things (we had to attend all the papers there were about 50) he would work away at little formulae on something I was doing. He had this ability of taking your stuff and giving you ideas for free and being enormously helpful. One of the few people that, when you wrote with an idea, he would write back praising it. That, I think, was a lot of his influence. I've said this to lots and lots of people since that time, and they've all agreed. Most of them have been people like this group. That was a measure of his influence.

John: Now he stayed in Manchester until some time in the '60s, didn't he, before going to Oxford? Afterwards, Max and Bob, where did you go?

Max: I came back here in August of 1963 and have been more or less here ever since. I don't know what more there is to be said.

Robert: I went to Oxford at the beginning of 1963 and was more or less out of Oxford again before he turned up, so would he have gone there late '66 or early '67?

David Lewis: '65-66 must have been the year he was at UCLA, because that was the year before I got there.

Mary Cresswell: They were most certainly at UCLA December 1965.

John: I first met him in Oxford, and he wasn't there long before I left. And — when did he die? '69? It was a curious sort of existence he had there, I felt. He wasn't really an Oxford person; he was a very friendly person with no pretensions.

Robert: He was the least pretentious person I ever met.

George: I visited him in Oxford in early '68, I remember. He couldn't have been there for very long, and he'd settled down. He was obviously very happy there indeed. One of his remarks to me was: "This is the good life", as if he'd really found it for the first time ever. He just belonged, and I knew that in many ways he wasn't the 'Oxford type', as one stereotypes the Oxford type, but he was vital — the Oxford people embraced him. He really did build up almost immediately a reputation for being about the best lecturer in Oxford.

Max: Yes — well, yes. when I think about the stories of his singing at parties and things — that's the sort of things I remember.

Robert: He had an extraordinary knack of being childLIKE without being childISH.

George: All this is quite true, but what it misses out is a kind of depth and humility and compassion about him that crept out when the occasion demanded it, but which was never obtruding when the occasion didn't demand it. There are so many cases of people who owed such a lot personally to his ability to feel his way, in a very non-paternalistic way, through their difficulties.

John: Shall we return to when you came back to New Zealand, Max? You said you've been more or less here ever since, and part of that was writing the book (Hughes and Cresswell [1968]) with George. Why on earth did you do that?

Max: Well, we wanted to teach modal logic. If you don't mind some autobiography. I learnt first about modal logic not through reading Prior, strangely enough, but through being given a copy of von Wright's book [1951], which is now out of print. It's called *An Essay in Modal Logic*. Because when I was a second-year undergraduate student, I ended up in either a lecture or a tutorial where everybody else in the class but I had fled, and I asked George whether there was logic beyond what we were doing. And he said: "Well, there's this stuff", and gave me von Wright's book on modal logic. And then I read *Time and Modality* (Prior [1957]), which I found extremely exciting, and was very keen to go to Manchester. When I

came back and started teaching, I thought, well, it would be nice to have a book in modal logic, and I was looking for a book to use. There was a book that eventually came out by Robert Feys [1965], which turned out to be not much more than a catalogue of the theorems of the various Lewis systems of modal logic. And of course, by that time, Kripke's work [1959, 1963] and the sort of work that became well known through Kripke's work — there were people like Kanger [who is at the conference but is not here tonight] — who were producing these semantics for the modal systems. We started teaching for a few years and started preparing our own notes. George said to me as a joke: "Well, if there isn't a book, we'll have to write one", and, well, we did.

George: The story about that is that Max knew the stuff already and I didn't. I learnt about modal logic from Max in order to write "That Book". So that book proceeded by Max writing out the stuff and me trying to understand it and rewriting it and putting it back to him and saying "Is that right?". That's more or less —

Max: More or less, but I think that both of us learnt more modal logic through writing the book than either of us knew before we started writing the book.

George: If you want to learn a subject, write a book about it.

Charles: I always imagine that I find Hughesian bits in that book. What about the part about the people who sit around when a proposition is pulled out and they put their hands up and some of them can see who has their hands up and little screens and one-way mirrors and stuff. Which of you thought that up?

(chaos)

George: The story about that is: I knew nothing, of course, about Kripke semantics or semantics of any kind, for modal logic when we started this. Max gave me an outline of how to define validity for T or S4 or something like that and said it was the genuine Kripke stuff. I thought, well golly, I'd better understand this, hadn't I? And I thought, perhaps it's a bit like playing a game of a certain kind, and what would that game be like? I got this idea of people putting their hands up, and so on, and I put it to Max, who said: "Yes, that's it". I thought if inventing the game helped me to understand what Max was saying, then just possibly reading about the game might help some other people, so we decided to put it in.

Max: Yes, I must tell a scurrilous story about Robert Bull who, in a review of our book in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* (Bull [1971]), complained that we had sacrificed elegance and aesthetic considerations to now, I must make grammatical sense: we sacrificed all these things in order to make it comprehensible to philosophy students.

Ken Pledger: Could I stick in a comment from the back row about that? Since George has mentioned the games, the first that any of us in the Mathematics Department had ever heard of modal logic was when the book had not yet been completed. George gave one of our early joint seminars in the 1960s on the hand-raising games, and it was from that moment that some of us including myself — started to get hooked on modal logic.

John: It seems at the moment you're painting a terribly inbred picture of New Zealand logic. Were there any other influences?

George: Oh, yes. Going back to Prior again, one thing we've missed out in the story of the 1950s was that he went across in 1956. I believe, to Oxford and, you know, this Wild Colonial Boy just hit Oxford and started to gather around him the main people doing logic, and he started to organise a lot of parties, almost, for the serious doing of logic. He also got in touch with the Merediths, in Northern Ireland.

Robert: In fact, he went over to Dublin in '56. Of course. Łukasiewicz had died just before Arthur got there, but he nevertheless went over to see what he could find about what Łukasiewicz had done with them.

George: He used to send me cyclostyled copies of screeds and screeds of stuff that they were working out together — mostly in modal logic, I think.

Robert: That's right, a whole lot of stuff on C5

George: — so he came back, just fizzing with all this stuff, and these people in the UK came to have, through Arthur, an influence on what went on here; I think that would have helped —

Max: And did Lemmon get Scott interested in modal logic? So it really does all go back to Arthur Prior.

John: And what about Michael Dummett, who got him interested in modal logic? Was it Lemmon, not Prior?

George: Well, Dummett was one of the people who was working with Prior at that time

Robert: Then he wasn't in on C5?

Charles: But he had been lecturing on a lot of things like that long before — intuitionistic logic.

Robert. Yes, I don't think he was much influenced by Arthur.

John: The present state is that we've got up to the early '60s with you coming back here.

Robert: Oh, very much later — the very end of '68.

John: You're at the end of '68, and Max was back here by '63.

Max: One of my teachers, of course, was Londey, who I don't think was ever, and I think still isn't, interested in modal logic, and he was almost entirely self-taught, wasn't he, George?

George: Yes, yes ... In fact, like lots of people, like Arthur and myself, for that matter, unless you count yourself as my teacher.

John: And when you came back in '63, Max, were there lots of students working in logic and higher degrees?

Max: There were a few students when I came back. I came back because David Londey had left.

George: Yes, you replaced David.

Max: Well, among our earlier students, one was Tom Richards, who is sitting back in the corner there. He was an honours student. I think the year I came back — I came back for the last part of the year, and David, I think, had done something earlier.

John: I think we're getting towards the late 1960s and the end of side 1 of the tape.

[Can we complete the] — period of Arthur Prior very quickly.

Tom Richards: I studied under him at Oxford and knew him before that at Manchester. He invited me up there to read a paper in early 1966, and told me at that stage that he had just got his invitation to Oxford. He made it quite clear that he regarded himself as going down there with a mission to fulfil. He said: "I have the job of bringing the light to Oxford", and went on to say that the trouble with Oxford logic is either you've got mathematical logicians who are unmotivated or you've got philosophers who are linguistically oriented and keep splitting too many hairs and there's a big gap in the middle. So he went down feeling that he was going to get them together, which of course is what he did and, as you said, he was very popular with the people there, although in seminars he would certainly be attacked from the left by the linguistic philosophers because he was just putting everything in symbols and missing the important distinctions. He was attacked from the right by the mathematicians because he wasn't being rigorous enough. He attracted a large following; he gave his first

series of lectures there on tense logic. He thought that this was a steal because he was only required to give eight lectures a year, and so he gave eight lectures on tense logic. It was a very exciting series of lectures, and he had a lot of Americans sitting in on his class, who provided a lot of good input. On what he used to put on at parties — I went to one of his parties and what was above his door there was Cpq [If p then q], and since the Oxford people didn't know any Polish logic, they didn't know where to look for the toilet.

Michael McRobbie: John, may I ask the panel two questions? One is: why did Prior go to Manchester? Did it have anything to do with the fact that Turing was there at that time?

Robert: Turing was already dead when Arthur went to Manchester. There wasn't any tie-up with Turing at all. I don't know why —

George: I'll make a guess: there was very little logic being done in New Zealand at all in the time when Prior was getting up his enthusiasm in the early '50s. He went on leave to Oxford in 1956. That was the time when he gave the John Locke lectures [1957], and he was just fizzing with enthusiasm for this, particularly the new tense logic stuff that he was working on. As I mentioned earlier on, he was the guiding spirit in getting up this group of people interested in logic in Oxford — and under Meredith in Dublin — and came back to New Zealand, I think, with a heavy heart, feeling that he'd had a glimpse of paradise there. I think that the Manchester people had some ideas at the time of setting up a second Chair of Philosophy and made tentative inquiries — they put out feelers — that if they did, would he be interested? When he came back and settled in New Zealand, he just pined for the kind of logical companionship that he could get in the U.K and not here. And when the offer came through, he just snatched it up in due course. I think that basically was the reason. But it's a bit conjectural.

Charles: But he didn't have logicians in Manchester.

George: But he had access to so many people.

Charles: He said the department was dividing in half. There was Dorothy Emmett and her people, but she would be going soon; and then there would be Arthur Prior and his people. But he was conscious of what he was trying to do in the department. I imagine.

John: I think perhaps that at that point — we should perhaps close this session and perhaps when Richard is around we can take it from there, but unless anybody has any other comment or question that they want to put, I think we might close the formal session.

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