Life and Work of Arthur Norman Prior
The following is the full table of contents for Prior's manuscript The Craft of Formal Logic found in box 22. The table of contents can also be found in an appendix to The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, ed. by P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny (1976a). The version here differs slightly from the appendix, due to the fact that we have been using the tables of contents found together with each separate part of the manuscript. This procedure yields a slightly more detailed and original table of contents.
Chapter 1. Propositions and Sentences
§1. The Proposition in Aristotle and his Successors.
§2. The 'Proposition-in-Itself'.
§3. The Ascription Theory of Believing.
§4. Proposition-Types and Proposition-Instances.
Chapter II. The Aristotelian Account of Affirmation and Denial
§1. Affirmation and Denial in the De Interpretatione.
§2. Affirmation and Denial in the Prior Analytics.
Chapter III. Later Developements of the Theory of Affirmation and Denial
§1. The Classification of Propositions in Aristotle's Successors: The Quantity of Categorical Propositions.
§2. The Quality of Categorical Propositions.
§3. The Opposition of Categorical Propositions in Aristotle's Successors.
§4. The Equipollence of Categorical Propositions in Aristotle's Successors.
Chapter IV. The Conversion of Categorical Propositions
§1. The Conversions of General Categoricals.
§2. The Conversions of Singular Categoricals, and Relative Conversion.
§3. Proofs of the Validity and Invalidity of Immediate Inferences.
§4. Is 'Immediate Inference' Inference?
Chapter V. The Aristotelian Theory of Categorical Syllogism
§1. The Fundamental Theory (Prior Analytics, I.1-25).
§2. Subsidiary Problems and Exercises (Prior Analytics, I.26-II.22)
§3. Induction, Example and Enthymeme (Prior Analytics, II.23-27).
Chapter VI. Later Developments of the Theory of Categorical Syllogism
§1. The Forms of Syllogism in Aristotle's Successors: Barbara Celarent.
§2. Rules of the Syllogism in Aristotle's Successors.
§3. The Principles of the Syllogism in Aristotle and his Successors.
§4. Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis.
§5. Is all Syllogism Circular?
Chapter I. The Logic of Compound Propositions
§1. The Logic of Compound Propositions from Aristotle to the Stoics.
§2. Compound Propositions with Negatives, in Boethius and Later.
§3. Allen, Brown and Carr.
Chapter II. The Horned Syllogism
§1. The Forms of the Dilemma.
§2. The Insolubilia.
Chapter III. Truth-Functions and Implication
§1. Compound Propositions as Truth-Functions: Tautologies and Contradictions.
§2. The Interpretation of the Conditional.
§3. Formal and Material Consequences.
§4. The Composition and Division of Implications.
Chapter I. The Parallelism between Hypotheticals and Categoricals
§1. The Figures of Categorical Syllogism and the Moods of Hypothetical.
§2. The Reduction of Hypotheticals to Categoricals, and the Boolean Interpretation of Hypotheticals.
Chapter II. Miscellaneous Interactions between Hypotheticals and Categoricals
§1. Demonstrative Induction
§2. Conjunctions of General Categoricals and Argument A Fortiori.
§3. Modified and Truncated Categorial Syllogisms with Hypothetical Conclusions.
Chapter III. Compound and Complex Propositions, and the Theory of Quantification
§1. Compound, Complex and Exponible Propositions.
§2. Compound and Complex Conditionals: Categorical Universals as Complex Conditionals.
§3. Compound and Complex Singulars: Generals as Compound Singulars.
Chapter I. The Kinds of Terms
§1. Subjects and Predicates.
§2. Categoremata and Syncategoremata.
§3. Types of Ambiguity.
§4. Abstract and Concrete, Singular and General.
§5. The Ten Predicaments.
Chapter II. The General Term
§1. General and Singular Terms in Whately and Mill.
§2. General and Singular Terms in Keynes.
§3. General and Singular Terms in Johnson, Peirce and Frege.
§4. General and Singular Terms in Principia Mathematica: Propositional and Descriptive Functions.
§5. The Eliminations of Abstract Nouns.
Chapter III. Existential Propositions, and the Existential Import of Categorical Propositions
§1. Mill's Flame-Breathing Serpent.
§2. Existential Propositions in Brentano.
§3. Existential Propositions in Symbolic Logic.
§4. The Existential Import of Singulars.
Chapter IV. The Relative Term
§1. Relative Terms in Aristotle.
§2. De Morgan and Double Quantification.
§3. From de Morgan to Peirce: Relative Terms as Rhemes.
§4. Relative Terms in Johnson: Functional Universals.
Chapter I. Modality
§1. The Opposition of Modals, and the Parallelism between Modality and Quantity.
§2. The Interaction of Modality and Quantity; and Composition and Division.
§3. Modality as a Form of Quantity.
§4. Quantity as a Form of Modality, and Other Modalities.
§5. Conventionalist Accounts of Modality.
Chapter II. The Logical Calculus
§1. The Presentation of Logical Laws as a Deductive System.
§2. The Axiomatisation of the Aristotelian Theory of Syllogism.
§3. Nicod's Derivation of the Logic of Truth-Functions from a Single Axiom.
§4. The System of Principia Mathematica.
§5. Truth by Convention Again.
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